

Senator Morse gave notice that his Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs would hold executive sessions next year on the program of Alliance for Progress.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee then adjourned at 11:40 a.m.]

FORTHCOMING MEETING OF THE UNITED NATIONS

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1962

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. John Sparkman presiding. Present: Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Lausche, and Hickenlooper.

Also present: Senator Allott of Colorado.

Mr. Holt and Mr. Henderson of the committee staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order, please.

The meeting this morning is for the purpose of discussing the U.N. General Assembly items.

Here is one of our delegates to the U.N. Assembly, Senator Allott. We are glad to have him with us this morning.

Senator Hickenlooper is supposed to be on the way here, and others. Mr. Secretary and Mr. Assistant Secretary, we are glad to have both of you with us.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much.

Senator SPARKMAN. I may say that the record should show that the Secretary is accompanied by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Mr. Harlan Cleveland.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one suggestion, since we are going to talk about the United Nations, I think in fairness to the Secretary and to the committee that before he leaves this room he ought to make whatever comment he wants to make on this latest propaganda sheet of Khrushchev's so that when the press asks us individually whether or not we even raised it at the committee we at least can say we raised it but we are not in position to make comment but it was discussed. I think it is a pretty ominous thing myself, and it is a typical bluffing statement on the part of Khrushchev, but I think it is shocking that he would use the language which Tass reports him as having used.

If there was ever a case of semantic intervention this is it. But on the other hand, the American people ought to have an answer to it, I think, at an early hour in some form. These are only my offhand remarks. What I said to the press this morning was that I would discuss it with my subcommittee and the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. [Edwin] Martin. I thought the comments of Khrushchev could very well develop into a serious crisis if he sought to implement them by setting up a beachhead for offense in Cuba and

that he would discover that his bluff would be called if he followed that course of action in Cuba.

That is all I said.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, I would be glad if we could save some time at the last, all of us would like to have your comments on it.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY HARLAN CLEVELAND, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Since there are more than 80 items already on the agenda of the U.N. Assembly and there undoubtedly would be 100 or more before the Assembly adjourns, I thought I would not get into too much detail of those 80 items, but to speak a little about the background and the environment and some of the special activity which would be going on at the Assembly and during the course of the Assembly.

We are delighted to have Senator Allott and Senator Gore, a member of this committee, on our delegation this year. I am looking forward to their participation.

The full text of the Tass statement today had not reached the Department by the time I left, so I have only a portion of it in front of me. We will want to give it immediate study and comment as soon as we can get the full text to see exactly where we are on it. It is to a considerable extent a repetition of a line which they have taken on many other occasions on a number of questions, but what we will be most interested in is to see whether what they have said about Cuba will be in any significant way different from what they have said about it before.

Up to this point it has been our judgment that they have held back from making an international all-out commitment to Cuba, and if this statement goes beyond that, if it threatens the buildup of a base here in this hemisphere or anything of that sort, then this could, of course, increase the crisis very significantly.

EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS

I have not seen the exact text of this yet, but I gather there is a portion of the statement which represents still another one of those transparent and crude efforts to try to influence and comment on American elections or free world elections. They have done it with Britain, they have done it with Italy, they have done it with France, some indication there is not to be a crisis on Berlin until the elections are over.

Senator SPARKMAN. That part rather puzzles me, I mean the way it was given over the radio.

Secretary RUSK. Any such comment is just about as gross as one could imagine.

Senator MORSE. That is right.

Secretary RUSK. Because if there is one thing that is clear it is that the U.S. Government is in business to do business if they have anything constructive to say about Berlin at any time, and second, the crisis on Berlin at any time before or after an election can be a

very dangerous thing because the West is united and determined on Berlin.

So that if there is anything that has been clearer about this country since World War II it has been that the Democrats and Republicans have been united on these great issues of defending the freedom and the security of our country with that of the free world.

So, I don't understand—well, I do understand—why the Soviets would have made such a gross comment on an election in this country. But in any event we will, Senator Morse, study that statement very fast and we will undoubtedly have some official comment on it. But we thought we ought to see the full statement before we make any official comment.

Senator MORSE. I agree.

KHRUSHCHEV'S EXPECTED VISIT TO U.N.

Secretary RUSK. Let me again, before getting into the actual key items on the agenda of the Assembly, make one or two comments about other matters. There has been a good deal of speculation about what Mr. Khrushchev is coming to the Assembly for. I think we can say with reasonable assurance that he does not plan to come at the beginning of the Assembly. He apparently indicated to U Thant if he came at all it would be toward the end of the Assembly, but he has not said that he is coming even then. He just left the door open for later on. We don't expect him to come at the beginning of the Assembly. Of course, the situation could change and he may in fact turn up. But we ourselves have had no negotiations or discussions with him on that subject.

THE BERLIN QUESTION

The rumors that have come out of different quarters that U Thant's discussions with him was the closest to an official discussion of that with him and the impression that U Thant had was that he would not be present at the beginning nor do we have any information indicating that the Soviets themselves will put the Berlin question on the agenda of the United Nations. Let me just comment a little about that because that is potentially an extremely important matter.

It has been our view in the West that in a matter as dangerous and complicated as this on which 104 nations would have a great many different views or no views at all, that it would not be wise, and I think U Thant agrees with us on this, for us to put the Berlin question into the assembly at this stage in any expectation that the United Nations could or would even attempt to seriously find a solution for it. But on the other hand, the U.N. stage of the Berlin question could be a critically important stage if it moves on, as we expect it well might, into the more serious crisis.

In other words, you will remember at the time of the first Berlin blockade the United Nations made a useful although not a decisive role. We have actions going on the ground which are very dangerous to both sides. It may be that at that point a U.N. phase would be one of the ways to keep this matter from blowing wide open at a time when we are having to insist upon our rights in Berlin.

So to a certain extent the U.N. stage is held in reserve for the time when it can maybe contribute something to the situation, but if it were to go into the United Nations today, the only attitude that the United Nations probably would or could take would be "Don't shoot but talk." Well, the talking opportunity is present, although there has been very little headway made in recent discussions because of Khrushchev's insistence on the removal of western forces from West Berlin. But at some stage, one side or the other may put the Berlin question on the agenda in either the Security Council or the General Assembly.

Now, an effort will be made to take advantage of the presence of a great many foreign ministers at the General Assembly to transact or have discussions both on a bilateral basis and on a multilateral basis in a variety of combinations.

We expect, for example, to have 1½ to 2-day meetings of the Latin American Ministers during the course of the General Assembly, a little later this month, before the end of this month and that will probably be held here in Washington.

THE SUBJECT OF CUBA

Now, the subject that will be for primary consideration there will be Cuba, and we do have indication that there are some, again some serious movements in the attitude of certain of the Latin American countries on the Cuban question because of their own growing concern about the Cuban issue. I refer now to countries like Mexico, Brazil and Chile, who still have relations with Cuba. The reporting of their own missions out of Cuba and the known facts about the Soviet arms program in Cuba have caused these countries to begin to take another look and with a change in Argentina on this issue that occurred after Punta del Este and the overthrow of the Frondizi Government, it appears we are finally getting within reach of hemisphere solidarity on this issue, even beyond, very considerably beyond what was expected at Punta del Este.

The issues that will be, the primary problems, that we have with the other countries, operational questions, have to do with such things as how we further protect, insulate, the other members of the hemisphere against any interference from Cuba. At the present time that takes the form of training individuals from other Latin American countries in Cuba and this traffic in persons is something that is of growing concern to the countries that have thus far been used as transit areas for them.

The widespread radio propaganda coming out of the new stations in Cuba is another part of the problem. The transfer of funds into such countries as Guatemala and Venezuela is something we think we ought to be able to operate more effectively against. And to be sure that we get the full coordination and cooperation from all of the inter-American countries and particularly in the Caribbean area to be sure that there is no illicit traffic in arms or no threat of any sort has any validity to it or any strength behind it coming out of Cuba because we certainly would move with our own armed forces immediately and promptly if there were any such motions against other countries in the hemisphere.

Then we need to be sure that the foreign ministers of the other countries are accurately informed about what is going on in Cuba and to consider then what else might be done to help reduce that situation.

But we will have an informal meeting of the inter-American foreign ministers during the assembly. Similarly the SEATO and CENTO foreign ministers will have some discussions and I think it is entirely probable there will be some group discussions among the NATO foreign ministers while they are here during the Assembly.

NEW PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY

In the Assembly itself, it appears that Zafrulla Khan of Pakistan has a long lead to become the President of the Assembly. He is a man of great experience and he has been in the past very helpful to the United States, and we think it will be of considerable advantage to us in some of the problems and debates and decisions that will have to come up during the course of the proceedings.

Senator SPARKMAN. By the way, he was one of the leading candidates in the Fifth General Assembly when the man from Iran beat him out.

Secretary RUSK. Zafrulla Khan had a tour on the World Court and now he is back as the Pakistan representative, a man who has great personal respect around the Assembly and we think he will make a good president.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did he retire from the court?

Secretary RUSK. Well, his term expired. The term is—

Mr. CLEVELAND. Nine years.

Senator SPARKMAN. Not eligible for reappointment?

Secretary RUSK. He was eligible but they did not re-elect him. I suppose it was more the political distribution of seats.

Mr. CLEVELAND. I think he was anxious to get back into politics.

ELECTION OF A SECRETARY GENERAL

Secretary RUSK. The next principal personnel question will be the question of the election of a Secretary General. At last year's Assembly the Troika proposal was decisively defeated or set aside, and the Soviets finally did go along with the election of U Thant as Secretary General, and without any impairment of the office of the Secretary General which is one of the real achievements of a great majority of the United Nations at the last Assembly. Now, the question of electing a Secretary General for a full 5-year term comes up.

We believe that U Thant has done a good job. He has not always followed our wishes in every particular point but he has acted with considerable courage and independence, and we think that it would be entirely appropriate for him to be re-elected. We don't know what the attitude of the Soviets will be to him.

He was reasonably cordially received in Moscow but they censored his speech when he gave a farewell speech to the Russian people upon his departure. He was critical in some respects of the Soviet policy in informing the people about what was going on, critical of their policy toward the Congo and that statement was censored on the Russian side.